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Abstract. The evolution of interactions between individuals or organi-
zations are a central theme of complexity research. We aim at modeling
a dynamic game on a network where an attacker and a defender compete
in disrupting and reconnecting a network. The choices of how to attack
and defend the network are governed by a Genetic Algorithm (GA) which
is used to dynamically choose among a set of available strategies. Our
analysis shows that the choice of strategy is particularly important if the
resources available to the defender are slightly higher than the attackers’.
The best strategies found through GAs by the attackers and defenders
are based on betweenness centrality. Our results agree with previous lit-
erature assessing strategies for network attack and defense in a static
context. However, our paper is one of the first ones to show how a GA
approach can be applied in a dynamic game on a network. This research
provides a starting-point to further explore strategies as we currently
apply a limited set of strategies only.
1 Introduction
Networks have been used to elegantly model systems with many interacting el-
ements in many different disciplines [16] including biology [10], linguistics and
social sciences [18], epidemics [4], infrastructures [17], and banking [3]. A cen-
tral question in network science is to understand the robustness of a network
if nodes or edges fail or come under attack [9,2]. The study of network robust-
ness has many different applications, such as assessing the vulnerability of power
grids [1], subway networks [13], and airline transportation networks [7]. Addition-
ally, social networks of interest are covert networks such as criminal or terrorist
? The authors have evenly contributed to the work presented in the paper.
2organizations [12]. For example, targeting one individual over another by police
force might have more effect on the communication capability of the network
depending on network topology. Analogously, technical networks of interest are
computer networks, where the maintainers of computer networks might attempt
to identify the best strategy to defend against cyber attacks or random failures.
Network topology plays a large role in how effective an attack is, and how
the network is able to defend itself. Albert et al. [2] demonstrated that scale-
free networks, unlike random networks, are very robust to random failure but
vulnerable to targeted attacks. This is due to the fact that most nodes in their
scale-free model had few connections, so the probability of randomly targeting
a highly connected and central node was low. The targeted attack, however,
was able to remove the small percentage of highly connected nodes rapidly,
thereby crippling the network connectivity much faster than random attacks.
Several researchers have addressed the issue of network robustness using iterative
attack and defense games on networks where attackers and the defending network
employ static attack and defense strategies against one another [14,8,5]. Holme
et al. [8] considered static attack strategies on edges as opposed to nodes, and
suggested edge betweenness as a more effective target of an attacker than attacks
on high degree nodes. Nagaraja and Anderson [14] extend Holme’s approach by
considering both static attack and defense strategies. The network is allowed to
defend, or rewire its connections to become less vulnerable to attack via a set
of predefined defense strategies. Likewise attacks on the network are performed
with a predefined strategy, where attacks based on node centrality were found
to perform best on disconnecting the network. Like Nagaraja and Anderson,
Domingo-Ferrer et al. [5] allow for iterated attack and defense rounds, and show
that the attacker’s knowledge of the network is also an important factor in the
effectiveness of an attack.
But while previous literature on iterated attack and defense has considered
many different attack and defense strategies, to date, no research has been done
to allow the attacker (or defender) to dynamically change strategies during the
course of the game. We extend previous approaches by allowing the attacker
and defender to operate with a set of strategies in each time step and to make
decisions based on mixing strategies. This allows not only for the possibility
that a single strategy could go to fixation, but also cyclical pattern of attack
and defense strategies to emerge. A second possibility is that it could simply
be advantageous to attack (or defend) based on mixing strategies during attack
and defense rounds. Or, it could be that attack and defense strategies simply
reach an equilibrium, where no further improvement of attack (or defense) strat-
egy is found by the participants. We examine attacker strategies which identify
network nodes to maximize the damage to the network defender. Contrary, net-
work defenders identify the best way to rewire the network following the attack.
The choice of strategies is dynamically determined by a genetic algorithm (GA)
for both attackers and defenders, and thus representing coevolution between
attacker and defender, or a coevolutionary ’game’.
32 The Model
In our model we have three fundamental entities that we deal with:
1. A network composed by a set of n nodes and m edges.
2. An attacker attempting to disrupt the network.
3. A defender attempting to repair the network after an attack to guarantee
its continuing functionality.
An attacker disrupts the network by removing a node and all its associated
edges. The defender, on the other hand, is allowed to reintroduce a node that
has been previously disconnected as a consequence of an attack by re-connecting
it to the network. The defender also adds edges to the network if he has enough
resources to spend. In fact, the attacker and defender each have an assigned set
of resources that they can use in their attack or defense process. The resources
for the attacker correspond to the number of nodes that he can remove, whereas
defender resources correspond to the number of edges that can be added to
the network following an attack. We assume that attackers and defenders have
complete knowledge of the network topology and that they perform their actions
one after the other beginning with an attack followed by a defense.
A particular simulation starts by generating an initial (first generation) pop-
ulation of an equal number of attackers and defenders. Their genes are initialized
randomly, and attackers and defenders are randomly paired up. Each attacker-
defender pair is assigned a network of n vertices and no edges. Based on the
rules defined by their genomes (which are explained in detail in section 3), each
defender adds new edges to the network, up to a total number of m edges. So
we start with a set of disconnected nodes and start to build the network from
scratch, not fixing any specific network topology at the start. However, fixing
the defender and attacker rules will create networks that are similar in topology.
After the network is initially built, the attacker removes k nodes in the net-
work, k being the amount of resources assigned to the attacker, which are the
same for all attackers. The choice of the nodes to remove depends on the attacker
genome. Once the attack phase is completed, the defender is allowed to add a
total of w edges to the network, w being the amount of resources assigned to the
defender, which are the same for all defenders. First, the nodes removed by the
attacker in this round are re-connected to the network. The nodes to which they
will be connected depends on the defender genome. If defender resources allow
additional edges to be inserted into the network, those edges are added to the
network by the following rule: the starting point for the edges is a random node
from the list of nodes which lost edges in the previous attack. The end point is
determined by the genetic algorithm. If there are still resources left after recon-
necting each of the nodes that have lost an edge in the previous attack, random
nodes in the network are picked as starting points. Again, the end points of the
new edges are determined by the genetic algorithm.
This process of attack and defense on the network is repeated for r rounds.
In summary, a round is an execution of the game with iterative attacks each
based on the k resources for the attacker and a (re-)wiring process consisting of
4w resources for the defender. In our simulations r is equal to 20, i.e. a total of
20 attack-defense rounds is played in each generation of the genetic algorithm.
After each round, the fitness (see Section 3 for the thorough fitness descrip-
tion) of the attackers and defenders is calculated and a final average fitness after
r rounds is computed for each individual in the population. Recombination of
individuals and mutations which are necessary to generate a new generation of
attackers and defenders are discussed in the next section. We are interested to
track over generations the evolution of the fitness function for both, attacker
and defender as a measurement of their performance in the game. We track over
generations the change in genomes as well, because we are interested to identify
prevailing strategies.
3 Genetic Algorithm
The GA is used to evolve the strategies applied by the attackers and defenders
and thus, allows for a dynamic development of the strategies that are applied
by the two groups. A strategy is a mechanism for both the attacker and the
defender to decide which node to attack or edge to create/rewire based on some
rules, measures or indicators on the network. First, we define the fitness function,
then we discuss the genomes of attackers and defenders, and finally we present
recombination and mutation strategies.
3.1 The fitness function
We define the fitness of the defender to be the number of nodes of the Largest
Connected Component (LCC) divided by the total number of nodes in the initial
network n, i.e.
fdef =
LCC
n
(1)
The attacker’s fitness is the opposite, i.e.
fatt = 1− fdef (2)
The size of the LCC is a good proxy of the resilience of the network, its ability to
keep its structure connected and thus allow interaction between the nodes. The
same metric has been used in previous studies [11,15], allowing our results to be
compared to previously-published ones. However, depending on the application
of our model, different fitness functions may be appropriate. In section 6 we
discuss this aspect in more detail.
3.2 Attacker genome
A set of strategies is available to the attacker indexed by j = {1, 2, 3} – these
strategies have been developed previously in the literature [11,15,5]:
51. High-degree removal: nodes are prioritized for removal in decreasing order
with respect to their degree.
2. High-centrality removal: nodes are prioritized for removal in decreasing order
with respect to their betweenness centrality, which is known to be more
related to connectivity than other centrality measures.
3. Random removal: nodes are prioritized randomly.
Each gene Gj corresponds to a weight on one of the strategies, and its value
varies from 0 to 100. Each strategy calculates a specific network metric (e.g.
degree or betweenness centrality) for every node i. The metric is normalized to
the interval [0, 1]. Thus, to each node i in the network, a value Nij in the interval
[0, 1] is assigned by each strategy. In combination with the importance of the
strategy as defined by the genome, this represents the removal ranking of a node
i. For each node in the network, the attacker’s genome assigns a number
TotalNi =
∑
j
GjNij (3)
which is a linear combination of all available strategies weighted by the attacker
genome. The probability of a node i to be attacked Pri is TotalNi divided by
the sum over TotalNi for all network nodes, i.e.
Pri =
TotalNi∑
i TotalNi
(4)
A node is removed from the network based on its probability Pri.
3.3 Defender Genome
The strategies of the defender are similar to the attacker strategies as they are
based on the same weighting algorithm. The starting point of an edge that is
added to the network is not determined by this weighting algorithm, but by a
sequence of rules as outlined in the previous section. Only the endpoint of the
new edge is determined by the defender’s genome.
The following strategies are available to the defender indexed by j = {1, 2, 3}
- these strategies have been developed previously in the literature [11,15,5]:
1. Preferential replenishment: nodes are ranked in decreasing order with respect
to their degree.
2. Balanced replenishment: nodes are ranked in increasing order with respect
to their betweenness centrality.
3. Random replenishment: nodes are ranked randomly.
The weighting of nodes is performed similar to the attacker, i.e. the genome
determines how the value of a certain metric for the nodes is weighted. See the
description of the attacker genome above for details.
63.4 Genome reproduction process
The indexed set of genes Gj , j = {1, 2, 3} representing the attacker and the
defender genome are initially randomly sampled from a uniform distribution in
the range [0, 100]. Reproduction consists of gene recombination: two attackers
or defenders from the current population are randomly chosen from the current
generation. The mechanism of selection follows the principle of genetic algo-
rithms known as roulette wheel selection [6]: the probability of being picked is
not uniform, but is proportional to the fitness of the agent. A random position
in the genome is chosen for crossover. At this position, the two individuals will
exchange their genetic material, taking the first part from the first parent and
the second part from the second parent6, as shown in Figure 1. The offspring
replaces the previous generation (i.e., parents), thus providing the new base of
the genetic material for the following evolution step.
Fig. 1. Example gene crossover
A mutation process occurs with a fixed 5% probability. The mutation in a
gene is obtained by sampling a value from a Gaussian distribution with the mean
equal to the current value of the gene and a standard deviation of 5.
4 Scenarios
We are interested in the following research problems: first, how does an attacker
applying a genetic algorithm perform against a static defender, i.e. a defender
with only one, fixed defense strategy. We next look at the inverted scenario,
i.e. how a static attacker performs against an evolving defender. Finally, we
allow both the attacker and defender to co-evolve against each other. For the
purpose of comparison, we also run each static attacker strategy against each
static defender strategy. Both defender and attacker have 3 different strategies
each. This implies that there are 16 different scenarios to assess in total.
6 As we have only 3 genes in the genome, there are only two possibilities: the offspring
will inherit the first gene from his first parent and second and third genes from his
second parent, or he will inherit the two first genes from the first parent and the
third gene from the second parent
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Fig. 2. Top: evolution of the mean of fitness in the attacker population when attackers
use the genetic algorithm against 3 static strategies. Bottom: Evolution of the mean
of attacker weights for different strategies in the genetic case. The transparent areas
indicate the standard deviation. Left: Attacker vs. Random defender. Middle: Attacker
vs. Preferential defender. Right: Attacker vs. Balanced Replenishment.
In the base run, we start with a population of 200 attackers and defenders,
operating on a network of 100 nodes and 150 edges, and run the GA for 500
generations. Attackers are allowed to remove 3 nodes while defenders rewire
5 edges. In a sensitivity analysis we test different defender budgets of 3,7, or
9 edges. The whole simulation is driven by random choices of attackers and
defenders and by a random (although directed) process of selection of individuals
in the genetic algorithm. That implies, that a different run of the same simulation
may show a different dynamical outcome. At the current moment, we did not
run the simulations for several times to analyze the variance of results due to
time constraints with the exception of the co-evolution case which was run 25
times. Further runs are left to be presented in future versions of this paper.
5 Results
5.1 Scenarios Results
Static Defenders Figure 2a shows that the dynamic attacker quickly ap-
proaches the fitness of the single best attacker strategy against a static random
8defender. The genes evolve accordingly (Figure 2c) , prioritizing high weights for
the betweenness strategy and much lower weights for the other two strategies.
It can also be observed that the standard deviation in the genes decreases over
time, indicating that the individuals in the population converge. Playing against
the other two static defender strategies show similar results (Figures 2e and 2f).
The worst static defense strategy is preferential attachment which can be de-
rived from the fact that the attacker fitness is highest in that case (middle in
Figure 2b). The best possible static defense strategy is balanced replenishment
as indicated by the low attacker fitness (Figure 2c). In all cases, the betweenness
attack strategy is selected by the attacker’s GA.
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Fig. 3. Results of simulation runs: Defenders applying the genetic algorithm against
3 static attack strategies. Top: Mean of fitness of defender. Bottom: Mean of defender
genes. The transparent areas indicate the standard deviation. Left: Random attack vs.
Defender. Middle: Degree attack vs. Defender. Right: Betweenness attack vs. Defender.
Static Attackers Also the defender has a preferred strategy, independent of
the static attacker strategy. It is balanced replenishment. However, the GA takes
more time to find the dominating strategy in comparison to the attacker’s GA
in some cases. Defending against a random attacker (Figure 3a) shows that the
defender’s fitness approaches the fitness of the best possible solution only after
400 generations - even though the balanced replenishment strategy is selected
9earlier as can be observed by the graph in Figure 3d. However, as long as the
random strategy has a rather high weight, the fitness of the defender is not
significantly increased. Only after ruling out the random defense, the fitness
increases rapidly. That indicates that even a small amount of mixing of strate-
gies may cause a rather bad performance of the defender. This is not the case
for the second and third comparison in Figures 3b,3c, 3e, 3f - if the attacker
applies the degree attack and betweenness strategy respectively, the defender
evolves rapidly in using the balanced replenishment strategy only. The fitness,
accordingly, increases quickly in both cases. The defender can deal best with the
random attack strategy, as indicated by the comparativley high overall fitness
in Figure 3a, while the best strategy for the attacker seems to be betweenness
attacks, as also confirmed by the results in the previous section.
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Fig. 4. Results of simulation runs. Left: evolution of the mean of fitness in the defender
and attacker population in the co-evolution case. Middle: Evolution of the mean of
defender weights for different strategies in the GA case. The transparent areas indicate
the standard deviation. Right: Evolution of the mean of attacker weights for different
strategies in the GA case. The transparent areas indicate the standard deviation.
Co-Evolution In the case of co-evolution, i.e. both, defenders and attackers
employ a genetic algorithm to select their strategy, attackers evolve quicker to-
wards the more efficient strategy, causing a decline in the fitness of the defender
(see Figure 4). However, after about 50 generations, there is a turn-around and
the defender starts selecting the best defense strategy, causing an increase in
the defender’s fitness. After defenders and attackers have evolved into applying
the balanced replenishment and betweenness attack strategies respectively, the
fitness function stabilizes and no further major fluctuations are observed – an
equilibrium is reached. This co-evolutionary process was tested for 25 different
instances (while the cases described in the previous section was only tested for 1
instance) and the variance in the overall observed outcome of the gene weights
and the fitness of defender and attacker was very low. The pattern shown in
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Figure 4 for one instance could, in a similar way, be observed in all instances of
the problem.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity analysis assesses the effect of different defender budgets, i.e. the
number of edges that are rewired after an attack, on the overall outcome. A high
defender budget plus an efficient defense strategy (i.e. balanced replenishment)
almost completely reduce the possibility of the attacker to increase her fitness
(see Table 1, row Attacker GA vs. Balanced Replenishment and budget of 9).
On the other hand, a low budget decreases the fitness improvements over time
for the defender (see Table 1, budget of 3). This indicates that a meaningful
game can only be played if the available budgets are in a certain, rather limited
interval - too high of a budget for one of the two sides will make any response
strategy inefficient. In the co-evolution case, the defender shows a lower fitness
at the end of the evolution process than in the beginning if the budget is smaller
or equal to 5 edges, while it is the other way round for a budget above that level.
Defender Budget 3 5 7 9
Attacker GA vs. FAS FAE FAS FAE FAS FAE FAS FAE
Random Defense 0.38 0.63 0.22 0.52 0.12 0.37 0.08 0.18
Preferential Defense 0.48 0.76 0.40 0.76 0.36 0.64 0.32 0.62
Balanced Replenishment 0.37 0.54 0.10 0.34 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Defender GA vs. FDS FDE FDS FDE FDS FDE FDS FDE
Random Attack 0.67 0.68 0.81 0.92 0.90 0.97 0.94 0.98
Degree Attack 0.49 0.54 0.63 0.81 0.81 0.98 0.90 0.98
Betweenness Attack 0.36 0.42 0.45 0.63 0.61 0.95 0.82 0.97
Co-Evolution FDS FDE FDS FDE FDS FDE FDS FDE
GA vs. GA 0.62 0.38 0.78 0.66 0.88 0.95 0.92 0.98
Table 1. Fitness of attackers and defenders with varying budgets. FAS and FAE
indicate the average fitness of the attacker at the start and the end of the simulation
(i.e. generation 1 and generation 500), respectively. FDS and FDE indicate the average
fitness of the defender at the start and at the end of the simulation, respectively.
6 Related Work
Several researchers have assessed the robustness of networks in case of attacks
on nodes or edges. Here we look more in detail to studies where the concepts
of evolution of a network, in terms of its topology, is tied to the behavior of
an attacker of the network. In a seminal paper by Albert et al. [2], the authors
demonstrate that scale-free networks are vulnerable to targeted attacks of nodes
of high degree, while fairly robust to random attacks. Holme et al. [8] consider
11
attacks on edges as opposed to nodes, and suggest edge centrality as an effective
target of an attacker.
As already mentioned in Section 1, the work of Nagaraja and Anderson [15]
is relevant to our paper since it considers an evolutionary game theory approach
that takes place on a network. In a way similar to our interpretation of the
evolutionary game, their game is organized in rounds and each round consists of
an attack followed by a recovery. The attack consists of targeting a number of
nodes to be removed, depending on the attacker budget. However, the recovery
is different than the one we propose in this paper, and consists in two stages,
namely replenishment and adaptation. The first stage deals with inserting new
nodes into the network and establishing new connections based on the defender’s
budget, while the second deals with rewiring existing links. The objective for
the attacker is to split the network in separate components. The authors also
consider betweenness as a type of attack and the effects are more disrupting
against all types of defense. Our approach is more flexible giving the possibility
to the attacker and defender to adapt or change their strategies (i.e., type of
attack/defense) during the game, while in [15] the strategies are chosen and kept
fixed through the game. Our model allows to identify the strategies for attackers
and defenders that provide the maximum fitness out of a potentially broad set
of strategies. In [15] the test performed takes into account scale free networks
as initial topologies, whereas our approach starts with an initial topology that
is already optimized by the defender under the assumption that the defender
initially generates the network. One aspect that we prove through the evolution
of the genome is the superiority in attack of the balanced replenishment strategy
that is highlighted also in [15]. Nagaraja and Anderson’s work is not without
limitations, however. The cost of implementing an edge is essentially zero since
the network is allowed to rewire with an arbitrary amount of newly added edges.
Kim and Anderson [11] expand upon the work of Nagaraja and Anderson.
Kim and Anderson give each attacker and defender a fixed budget, or cost to
add nodes and edges after an attack, and analyze the effect of attacks on a
variety of different network topologies. They find a strategy of connecting low
centrality nodes is the best defense strategy. However, as the edge to node ratio
increases, the network becomes more robust, and even adding edges randomly
is effective against targeted attacks. They find that there is a threshold value
for the proportion of edges to nodes at which point the effectiveness of attacks
decreases drastically.
The work of Domingo-Ferrer and Gonzalez-Nicolas [5] is based on the ideas
and findings of previous work by Nagaraja and Anderson [15] and Kim and
Anderson [11] and adds further properties to the networks and the experiment
set. In the paper the authors analyze the evolution of the order and average
path length of scale-free networks (weighted and unweighted) under attack and
defense. The only strategy of attack considers betweenness centrality as the mea-
sure to identify the most critical node; whereas defense is achieved following two
types of strategies: delegation and node replenishment. The results show basi-
cally that an important factor is the visibility that an attacker has of the network,
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while there is basically no difference in the disruption behavior of weighted and
unweighted networks. Our approach is more flexible considering the possibilities
of different strategies of attack and defense and networks that are not fixed a
priori, but built by the defender that is usually the organization that has to
defend from the attacks.
7 Conclusions and future work
We have shown that our approach to model interactions between attackers and
defenders can be successfully modeled using genetic algorithms. Our results con-
firm what has been found in previous papers which compared various static
strategies. In addition, our work shows that strategies for link placement can
also be applied to generate networks from scratch, as we do in generating the
networks, achieving already an initial strength against some types of attacks (in
contrast to other papers, which only used them to rewire networks after they
have been attacked)7. Obviously, the success of a defense and attack depends
on the available resources. The choice of the strategy matters primarily when
the defender’s resources are slightly larger than the attacker’s resources. In any
other case, the results of the game are going to be biased towards the side with
the resource advantage. If the defender resources are slightly higher than the
attacker’s and if the defender’s goal is to maintain or increase the LCC and the
attacker aims for the opposite, there are clear winning strategies among the ones
tested in this study: the balanced replenishment and betweenness attack strat-
egy, respectively, can be considered to be the most efficient ones, independent of
which strategy is applied by the opponent. An equilibrium situation arises if the
two opponents apply these strategies, although the defender appears to evolve
slower than the attacker.
This result may be applied to social networks, computer networks, or any
other kind of network. From an empirical perspective, it would be interesting
if similar strategies are observed in real networks (i.e. where they have evolved
‘naturally’). From a normative point of view, the results of this paper and related
work can be used to design strategies to defend against attacks or to target
attacks against certain nodes in networks.
Future work will include the development and testing of new defender and
attacker strategies - currently, only three strategies are included. A larger num-
ber of strategies may make the game dynamics more complex than the current
version, which allows for a stable equilibrium in the co-evolution case. Addi-
tionally, the current fitness function emphasizes connectedness of the network,
but does not assess the efficiency of the network in providing transportation or
communication services. Different fitness functions which may include a combi-
nation of the largest connected component with some measure of efficiency as,
for example, the diameter or effective diameter of the network, therefore might
be considered interesting options for future research.
7 However, this difference is somehow minor if we consider that many attack-defense
rounds applying the same defense strategies will cause the network topology to
resemble a network that was built from scratch using the very same defense strategy.
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